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No. 84-1379-AFX
DIAMOND, et al.
(Illinois officials
and doctors)

CA7
[&Cj], Campbell [sdj])

v.
CHARLES, et al.
(doctors opposed to Illinois
abortion regulations)

-----,

SUMMARY:

Federal/Civil

Appellants maintain that the

C~ed

Timely
in

ho~gc2J

provisions of the Ill Abortion Law unconstitutional and permanently
enjoining their enforcement.
FACTS AND HOLDING BELOW:

On Oct 30, 1979, the Ill General Assem-

bly amended the state's abortion law to provide for increased regula-

-

tion of certain procedures.

2 '
ll

Sections 6(1) and 6(4) con9 ern an attend-

ing physician's "standard of care" with respect to maintaining an
aborted fetus' life: §§(2) (10) and ll(d) require any person prescrib7

ing an "abortifacient" (any instrument or drug designed to cause fetal
death)

to inform the recipient.

criminal offenses.

Violations of these provisions are

That same day, appellees, several doctors and an

---~

--.,

abortion clinic, filed this §1983 suit in the DC NDill (Flaum, J.)

------"-....-

""------~---.__.....,.___-

against appellants, the Ill Attorney General, a class of Ill State
Attorneys, and several intervening doctors, alleging that the provisions were unconstitutional and seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief.

On Nov 16, 1979,

th~re1iminari1y enjoin~d

§§6(1) and 6(4) because they incorporated

enforcement of

a~nconstitutional

---?

defini-

------

tion of viability: the DC refused to enjoin enforcement of §§2(10) and

1~-;;;;;a1, th~ that §~ ) shou1d~so

be

enjoined because they forced physicians "to act as the mouthpiece for
the State's theory of life."

627 F.2d 772, 789-790 (1980).

-~

After another preliminary hearing before the DC, which is not

part of this appeal, the DC (Kocoras, ,J.), in Oct 1983, was prepared
to rule on cross-motions for summary judgment.

At this point, the 3

challenged laws provided as follows:

(1)

Sectio~ ,

which imposes a standard of care on physicians

who perform abortions on a "viable" fetus: 1

1 The Ill Abortion Law defines "viability" as "that stage
of fetal development when, in the medical judgment of the
attending physician based on the particular facts of the case
before him, there is a reasonable likelihood of sustained
Footnote continued on next page.
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'

"No person who intentionally terminates a pregnane ~ after the
fetus is known to be viable shall intentionally fail to exercise that degree of professio~ skill, care and diligence to
preserve the life and health of the fetus which such person
would be required to exercise in order to preserve the life
and health of any fetus intended to be born and not aborted.
Any physician or person assisting in such a pregnancy termination who shall intentionally fail to take such measures to
encourage or to sustain the life of a fetus known to be viable, before or after birth, commits a Class 2 ~elony if the
death of a viable fetus or infant resurt:S from such failure."
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, ,181-26, §6(1) (emphasis added).
(2) Section 6(4), which imposes a similar standard of care on
p~ysicians

performing abortions on a possibly viable fetus:

"No person who intentionally terminates a pregnancy shall intentionally fail to exercise that degree of professional
skill, care and diligence to preserve the life and health of
the fetus which such person would be required to exercise in
order to preserve the life and health of any fetus intended to
be born and not aborted when there exists, in the medical
judgment of the physician performing the pregnancy termination
based on the particular facts of the case before him, a possibility known to him of more than momentary survival of the
fetus, apart from the body of the mother, with or without artificial support.
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, ,181-26, §6(4) (emphasis added).
(3) Sections 2(10) and ll(d), which define "abortifacient" and
require a physician who prescribes an "abortifacient" method of birth
control to inform his patient that he has done so:
Section 2(10).
"'Abortifacient' means any instrument, medicine, drug or any other substance or device which is known to
cause fetal death when employed in the usual and customary use
ror which it is manufactured, whether or not the fetus is
known to exist when such substance or device is employed."
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, ,181-22, §2(10).
Section ll(d).
"Any person who sells any drug ••• which he
knows to be an abortifacient and which is in fact an abortifacient, unless upon prescription of a physician, is guilty of a
Class B misdemeanor. Any person who prescribes or administers
survival of the fetus outside the womb, with or without
artificial support." Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, 1!81-22, §2(2).
The law defines "fetus" as "a human being from fertilization
untilbirth.
Id., §2(9).

- 4 any instrument ••• which he knows to be an abortif ~cient, and
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly fails to i h form the
person for whom it is prescribed or upon whom it is administered that it is an abortifacient commits a Class C misdemeanor." Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, ,[81-31, §ll(d).
The DC held that §6(1) was valid and declined to enjoin enforcement of this provision.

The court also held, however, that §§6(4),

2(10), and ll(d), were unconstitutional and thus permanently enjoined
their enforcement.
For the first time before the CA7 at oral argument, appellants
suggested that appellees' challenges to §§6(1) and 6(4) were moot given the legislature's June 1984 amendments.

Sections 6(1) and 6(4)

were amended to place more emphasis on the physician's medical judgment.2

Apparently, these amended provisions are currently the subject

of a temporary restraining order entered by the DC NDill in Keith v.
Daley, No. 84 C 5602 (1984).

For that reason the CA7 declined to rule

2 section 6(1), as amended, deletes the "known to be
viable" proviso and expressly incorporates the definition of
"viability" contained in §2(2):
"Any physician who intentionally performs an abortion when, in
his medical judgment based on the particular facts of the case
before him, there is a reasonable likelihood of sustained
survival of the fetus outside the womb with or without artificial
support, shall utilize that method of abortion which, of those he
knows to be available, is in his medical judgment most likely to
preserve the life and health of the fetus."
P.A. 83-1128, H.B.
1399, §6(1).
Section 6(4), as amended, follows suit, providing in
pertinent part:
"Any physician who intentionally performs an abortion when, in
his medical judgment based on the particular . facts of the case
before him, there is a reasonable possibility of sustained
survival of the fetus outside the womb, with or without
artificial support, shall utilize that method of abortion which,
of those he knows to be available, is in his medical judgment
most likely to preserve the life and health of the fetus.
P.A.
83-1128, H.B. 1399, §6(4).

- 5 -

on the validity of these provisions.
The CA7 rejected appellants' suggestion of mootness and held that
the 3 provisions at issue were unconstitutional.

Accordingly, the

court affirmed the DC's permanent injunction with respect to §6(4)
§§2(10) and ll(d), and directed the DC to enter a permanent injunction
of§6(1).

ate could still prosecute

did

such as appellees, for violating the terms of that provision, which
remained in effect from Oct 1983 to June 1984; §6(1) contained a 3year limitations period.

The court reasoned that this possibility of

prosecution constituted a live controversy within Article III.

With

respect to §6(4), the court observed that this provision had been subject to a continuous injunction since 1979.
sibility of prosecution.

Hence, there was no pos-

Nevertheless, the court held that the amend-

ment did not moot the case.

Following the statement in City of Mes-

quite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455

u.s.

282, 289, n. 10 (1982) , 3 the

court concluded that appellants had failed to prove that the State
will not "return to its old ways" if the court dismisses appellees'

3 In City of Mesquite, the plaintiff contended that a
municipal zoning ordinance was unconstitutionally vague. During
the pendency of the plaintiff's appeal, the defendant City
revised the ordinance and removed its objectionable language.
The Court held that the revision did not moot the plaintiff's
appeal, observing:
"The test for mootness in cases such as this is a stringent one.
Mere voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not
moot a case; if it did courts would be compelled to leave '[t]he
defendant ••• free to return to his old ways.'" 455 u.s., at
289, n. 10 (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S.
629, 632 (1953)).

-

claim.

6 -

Moreover, appellants had not demonstrated

effects" of §6(4) were eliminated by the recent amendment.

Section ~ .

2.

fetal life is
-----

-::z_

co~ng
_ _ ___,

Although the State's interest in preserving
at the stage of viability, the State may only

regulate in such a context if it narrowly tailors its regulations to
the precise interest at stake.
(1973).

/

Roe v. Wade, 410

u.s.

113, 163, 165

Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387 (1979), makes clear

that the State, in serving its compelling interest, must respect the j

physician's

~'i4~~~9_:!;~n ·~

ing how to carry out her abortion.

in de ;::'min

In particular, the State may not

interfere with the attending physician's medical judgment in determining the precise point in a woman's pregnancy at which viability exists.

u.s.

Id., at 395-396; accord, Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
52, 64 (1976)

is ~

sician").

~

("the determination of whether a particular fetus 1/)t!/utt. ..

and must ~ , a matter for the responsible at.:.,endin~ y

j,vu_

The court held §6(1) invalid because it does not specify

that the attending physician's viability determination alone shall
govern;

in this respect, the provision "improperly encroaches on

attending physician's medical judgment in treating his patient."

the ~

749

F. 2d, at 4 59.
Moreover, the court observed that §6(1) fails to give physicians
and their assistants explicit notice of the type of conduct the State ~
purports to condemn.
"Because [§6(1)] abuts upon a woman's fundamental right to
consult her doctor about abortion and to receive the doctor's
unimpeded medical judgment, it threatens to chill the exercise
of her freedom.
Specifically, the section encumbers the
woman's exercise of a constitutionally protected right by
placing obstacles in the form of criminal sanctions in the
path of the doctor upon whom she is entitled to rely."
Id.,
at 460.
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Under the circumstances, the court concluded that §6(l) t is "unconstitutionally vague."

In a footnote, the court noted that the statute's

amended definition of viability {§2(2)) did not remedy §6(1) 's imprecision because §6 (1) still fails to inform the

physi~ian

.._...,_.as to whose

~

3.

Section 6(4).

1:/17 ~

Unlike §6(1), this provision purports to reguJ\

late the performance of abortions at a stage before viability.

This

statute creates a direct interference with a woman's right to discuss ....

~

.,..-

--

...............

~ --....... =="\w:a

~

rt

"""'

abortion with her physician and to receive her physician's unimpeded
---------~ ~

medical judgment because of its criminal penalties.

The court con-

eluded that the statute creates the distinct possibilty that the woman
will be unable to exercise her right to choose abortion because her
doctor refuses to perform an abortion at the risk of going to jail.
Given this burden on the woman's right to have an abortion, the State
~

must have a compelling interest and prove that it has written §6(4) to
protect only that interest.

The State's compelling interest in pre-

serving fetal life cannot justify §6(4) because that provision applied
to certain pre-viability abortions.

Similarly, the State's compelling

interest in protecting the woman's health cannot save §6(4) because
that provision penalizes hostile activity which is harmful to the
fetus' health and does not in any manner seek to protect the mother's
health.

In light of the State's failure to present any other compel-

ling interest which could justify §6{4) 's restriction on a woman's

------.-*

freedom to choose an abortion, the court held that §6(4) unconstitutionally infringes the woman's fundamental right.
4.

Sections 2(10) and ll(d).

The Court in Roe v. Wade, and City

of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct.

- 8 -

·.
2481 (1983), ruled that States

~!::_e ~ _f?W~ tq ~..::erride

the

rights of a pregnant woman by adopting one theory of when life begins.
City of Akron explictly prohibited the State from foisting upon the
pregant woman its view that life begins at conception in order to justify its regulation of abortion.

103

s.

Ct., at 2500.

The court con-

eluded that §§2(10) and ll(d) constitute such an attempt by the State
because the sections incorporate the definition of "fetus" in which
_._

the State classifies a fetus as a human being from fertilization until •
deatl1 •

......-- The

court rejected appellants' argument that the sections do not

at all require physicians to reiterate the State's theory that life
begins at conception.
"However physicians choose to comply with the mandate of section ll(d), they nevertheless must notify their patients that
the drug or device which they have prescribed will terminate
the life of any fetus which their patients might be carrying.
This section not only intrudes upon the medical discretion of
the attending physician, but it also impermissibly imposes the
State's theory of when life begins upon the physician's patient." 749 F.2d, at 462.
The court concluded that the State's interest in protecting "rnaternal emotional and physical health" cannot justify §§2(10) and ll(d)
because the sections impose on those women who prefer abortifacient
methods of birth control the State's theory that abortifacients kill
unborn children.

"The State may not treat such women inequitably in

order to protect the emotional health of women who oppose abortifacients."

Ibid.

Also, the State's interest in preserving fetal life

cannot justify these provisions:

these provisions operate in situa-

tions where the woman is not pregnant: and when the woman is pregnant,
the provisions impermissibly restrict the attending physician's discretion at a stage in the mother's pregnancy at which neither of the

-

9 -

'

State's recognized interests (preserving fetal life or
mother's health) may be compelling.

~
rotecting the
I

Finally, these provisions in-

fringe upon a constitutionally protected right to choose a method of
contraception in a sitution where the State has no compelling countervailing interest.

Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431

u.s.

678,

688-689 (1977).
CONTENTIONS:

Appellants-Sections 2(10) and ll(d).

Appellants contend that these provi-

sions, which merely seek to ensure that women are informed about abortifacients, are fully consistent with the Court's guidelines in Danforth and City of Akron.

These cases hold that the State has the au-

thority to take steps to inform women about the nature and consequences of abortion procedures.

Appellants take issue with the CA7's

reasoning that these provisions render physicians "mouthpieces" of the
State.

City of Akron held that only when the statute directs the doc-

tor to use specific words, as did the Akron ordinance at issue, can
the use of those words be attributable to the State.

Section ll(d),

however, does not require the doctor to recite any specific litany;
the statute simply requires the doctor to state the truth--that he is
prescribing an abortifacient.

Moreover, appellants disagree with the

CA7's conclusion that the provisions somehow infringe a woman's right
to decide to use contraceptives.

The provisions' "plain meaning" en-

compasses only abortifacients (drugs or devices that prevent birth
after fertilization), not contraceptives (drugs or devices that prevent fertilization).

Finally, appellants argue that the CA7's sugges-

tion that §ll(d) is unconstitutional because "it is somehow inequita-

- 10 -

ble to require that women wishing to use
they are using them" is preposterous.

abortifacient~

Jur. St. 26.

be hold that

Sections 2(d) and

ll(d) are designed to protect the fundamental rights of women who are
opposed to abortion by allowing them to choose intelligently to refrain from using abortifacients.

Thus, these provisions protect the

women most likely to experience harm--those who unknowingly accept
abortifacients and later learn what they thought was a contraceptive
or other medication was in fact something they morally oppose.
Mootness.

Appellants claim that the 1984 amendments render any

challenge to §6(1) moot, because these amendments substantially clarify any vagueness in the law.

The amended version of §6(1) specifies

the physician's duty toward the fetus--to use the same skill, care and
diligence to preserve the life and health of the fetus to be aborted
as would be required to preserve the life and health of a fetus intenden to be born.

In addition, the amendments, because of appellees'

facial challenge, cure whatever "chilling effect" the unamended provisions may have had.

Similarly, the CA7 erred to believe that there

was any reasonable possibility that the State would reenact the old
provisions.

Finally, the CA7 erred to hold that the possibility of

prosecution for violating the unamended version of §6(1) established
the necessary case or controversy.

This conclusion has no basis in

reality because the State has never sought to prosecute physicians on
the basis of the prosecutor's "second-guessing" of their decisions.
Validity of §6(1).

Appellants contend that the CA7 ignored the

canon of statutory construction that courts should interpret statutes
to avoid declaring them unconstitutional.

Section 6(1) may fairly be

read as allowing only the attending physician's determination of via-

- 11 -

,

' •'

bility to control.

'

( 'I

With this construction, the prov1s1on is no longer

vague and satisfies constitutional standards.

This limiting construe-

tion was supported by the Ill Attorney General and State Attorney Daley in briefs filed before the CA7.

Under these circumstances, the

CA7 clearly erred in adopting the more expansive reading of §6(1).
Validity of §6(4).

Appellants point out that the State has a

legitimate interest in protecting fetal life.

The only effect of

§6(4) is to restrict hostile activity directed toward the fetus.

In

no circumstances does §6(4) place any obstacle on the decision whether
or not to terminate the pregnancy.

The woman remains free to consult

with her physician and decide to terminate her pregnancy for whatever
reason she and her physician decide upon.

Appellants argue that

"proper balancing" of the State's interest and the woman's right to
privacy dictates that §6(4) be upheld.

Roe v. Wade recognized the

woman's right to decide to have an abortion.

This right does not in-

elude the right to kill the fetus when there is a reasonable possibility that the fetus is capable of sustained survival outside the womb.
The Court should review the issue presented by §6(4)--the extent of
the State's authority to regulate abortions before the viability stage
on behalf of the fetus in a manner that does not infringe upon a
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy.

Appellees-Sections 2(10) and ll(d).

Appellees agree with the CA7 that

these provisions may not stand in light of Danforth and City of Akron
because they unconstitutionally intrude on the physician's medical
discretion and force the physician to "foist upon" the patient the

- 12 ''

State's view that life begins at conception.

ll

The State ' in these pro-

visions - is improperly attempting to influence the woman's
constitutionaly protected right of private decisionmaking in matters
relating to birth control by requiring physicians to inform all women
that certain methods of birth control cause the death of an unborn
child or human being.
Mootness.

For the reasons stated by the CA7, appellees agree

that the 1984 amendments to §6(1) and §6(4) do not render the case
moot.
Validity of §6(1).

The CA7, applying settled law, correctly con-

cluded that §6(1) was unconstitutional in light of its vagueness with
respect to whether the physician's viability determination controlled.
Appellants essentially concede the point, but then pull a "limiting
construction" out of thin air.

Contrary to

appella~ts'

suggestion, no

limiting construction has been proffered by a state court or enforcement agency.

Appellants simply have borrowed an "argument" first

raised in a reply brief to the CA7.
Apart from this constitutional infirmity, §6(1) was properly
struck down because it unnecessarily chills a physician's exercise of
his medical judgment and thus indirectly inhibits a woman's exercise
of her fundamental right to consult her doctor about abortion.

In

addition, §6(1) is not drafted with the precision necessary when the
State imposes criminal penalties for a physician's handling of abortion procedures.
Validity of §6(4).

In Colautti v. Franklin, 439

u.s.

379 (1979),

the Court made clear that before viability a State may not impose direct obstacles, such as criminal penalties, to further its interest in

~

.

'.
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the potential life of the fetus.

The CA7 simply follo ed this deci-

sion to strike down §6(4) because it effectively interferes with a
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy at a stage where the State's
interest is not compelling.

Finally, appellees maintain that there is no need for the Court
to set this case for full briefing and oral argument.

The CA7's cor-

rect application of well-settled precedent should be summarily affirmed.
DISCUSSION:

Although the 1984 amendments perhaps lessen the sig-

nificance of the CA7's ruling, they do not appear to eliminate an Article III "case or controversy."

for ~ ),

Physicians may still be prosecuted

and the perceived "chilling effects" of the

pro-~~ •

vision continue.
Turning to the merits, the Court's current bout with Thornbourgh
v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, No. 84-495
(draft per curiam dismissing the appeal; circulated Jan 10, 1985),
indicates that the Court does not welcome docketing another abortion
case.

I have little to add to the CA7's resolution of the issues in-

volved.

Although the court chose to interpret §6(1) literally, so as

not to have the physician's determination control, the court should
not be faulted for reading the statute as loosely as it was drafted.
The state legislature appears to have wanted to inject some uncertainty into the field, and it is just this type of vagueness that this
Court has consistently rejected.
With respect to §6(4), I tend to think that the CA7 correctly
recognized that the provision would inhibit a woman's ability to exer-

- 14 -

'1
cise her right to terminate her pregnancy under circumstances where
the State's interest is not compelling.

Perhaps the CA7 did not give

sufficient weight to the State's interest in nurturing fetal life, but
at the same time, the court recognized that the provision swept too
broadly so as to infringe the woman's fundamental right to choose to
terminate her pregnancy without any unnecessary obstacles from the
State.
Despite appellees' arguments, I cannot find much fault with the
CA7's treatment of §§2(10) and ll(d).

On the surface, it is difficult

to argue with appellees' point that a woman should know
she is taking will kill a fetus.

~

the drug

On the other hand, the CA7 followed

Danforth and City of Akron to conclude that these provisions placed
physicians in the precarious position of carrying out the State's view
of when life begins.

~nder

the circumstances, the provisions effec-

tively interfered with the woman's right to choose a particular method
of contraception and to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy.
Given the 1984 amendments, which substantially reduce the importance of the CA7's ruling, as well as the CA7's correct application of
this Court's precedents to the specific provisions at issue, I recommend that the Court affirm the CA7's judgment.
I recommend affirm.
There is a motion to dismiss or affirm.
April 8, 1985

Lazerwitz
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:
From:

Mr. Justice Powell

October 15, 1985

Cabell
No. 84-1379, Eugene F. Diamond & Jasper F.
Williams v. Allan G. Charles, et al.
On Appeal from CA7
Argument: Tuesday, November 5, 1985

Questions Presented
1.

Was there a justiciable case or controversy present

in a facial challenge to sections 6(1)

and 6(4)

of the Illinois

Abortion Law, when relevant statutory provisions had been amended
and substantially altered?

2.

May

Illinois

require

physicians

who, prescribe or

1

administer abortifacients to inform their patients that they have
done so?
3.

If

the court of appeals did not err

in addressing

old section 6(1), did it nevertheless err in failing to adopt a
saving interpretation?
4.

Can Illinois require the use of a method of abortion

most likely to preserve the life of the fetus after the fetus has
a reasonable possibility of survival?

I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case

is a companion to No.

American College of Obstetricians.
ates discussion on

84-495,

Thornburgh v.

This memo omits or abbrevi-

those points covered

in

the

bench memo for

that case.

0

1

Appellants,

Drs.

Diamond and Williams

(the

latter

now

~lv

deceased),

~~

'Court of Appeals holding sections 2(10), 6(1), 6(4), and ll(d) of

V

A~

Q/' the

appeal

from

the

final

judgment

of

the

7th Circuit

Illinois Abortion Law unconstitutional.
On October 30, 1979, Appellees filed a complaint enjoin-

ing the enforcement of the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975 [sic],
which had been passed that day by the General Assembly.
District Judge

Flaum enjoined

and

of medical care

6 (4)

(duty

the enforcement of sections 6 ( 1)
toward

"viable"

fetus)

they incorporated an invalid definition of viability.
sections

2 (10)

and

11 (d)

Then-

because

He upheld

(duty to inform about abortifacient).

1

The Court of Appeals reversed Judge Flaum's holdin ,9 on those lat1
,1
ter two sections.
1
On remand,

Judge Kocoras issued a permanent injunction

against sections 2(10), ll(d), and 6(4), but upheld section 6(1)
and dissolved
against

it.

appeal,

the

the

preliminary

injunction that had been entered

Both sides appealed.

however,

the pendency of

that

~ded sec~~ an~

Illinois legislature

The Court of Appeals,

our ing

ruled

that the controversy con-

cerning old sections 6(1) and 6(4) was not moot because there was
no assurance

77
.

that the State would not "return to its old ways"

and because the defendants had not "demonstrated that fthe amendment]

irrevocably eradicated the effects" of section 6 (4).

The

Court of Appeals then found both sections 6(1) and 6(4) unconstiThe

tutional.

court

also

affirmed

the

permanent

injunction

against sections 2(10) and ll(d).
This Court noted probable jurisdiction on May 20, 1985,
and scheduled this case for argument with Thornburgh.

II.

~~-'-'not

~~-

DISCUSSION
Challenges
m~t

to

-~

ear 1 ier

version of sections

6 (l)

is

I
''
because there is still the threat of prosecution under

~ the ~r- P~.S'.Yis ~qn.

uotfJ

the

tion 6(4)

Challenges to the earlier version of sec-

is not moot because . the amendment did not materially

(,tl'"

~I

alter

the alleged

infirmities.

On the merits,

it appears that

in holding unconstitutional the ( /11
~
provision requiring that physicians inform their patients of the
(l)

the Court of Appeals erred

use

of

an

abortifacient

because

of

the

substantial

discretion

"2o

left to the physician;
failing

to

adopt

a

. not err in
the Court of Appeals '<hd

(2)

I

strained

6(1); and (3) section 6(4)

1'1

saving

interpretation

of

section

intrudes on a patient's rights by re-

quiring the use of a method of abortion most likely to preserve
fetal life when the fetus is only potentially viable.
A.

Mootness of Challenges to Sections 6(1) and 6(4)
The

appellants

contend

that

although

there

is

a

justicable case or controversy with respect to amended sections
6(1)

and

6(4),

the

Court

unamended provisions.
440

u.s.

625,

631

of

Appeals

erred

in

reviewing

the

Relying on County of Los Angeles v. Davis,

(1979),

appellants argue

that

the voluntary

cessation of the illegal conduct does dispel the controversy with
respect to the unamended provisions because " ( 1)

it can be said

with assurance that 'there is no reasonable expectation ••• ' that
the

alleged

violation

will

recur,

and

(2)

interim

relief

or

events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effect of
the alleged violation."
While I believe, unlike the Court of Appeals, that it is
unlikely that the General Assembly will re-enact the old provision that it recently amended,
these old sections is not moot.

~
1;-L

the controversy with respect to
As the Court of Appeals found,

the defendants offered no evidence to rebut the possibility of

-

such prosecution for

violations of "~old

..)::he section was in effect.

~~~
yr·
to support

6(1) "" that occurred with

This ground is certainly sufficient

a review of the old 6(1).

The controversy with re-

spect to old section 6(4) still exists because, as appellant concedes, new section 6(4) contains the same provisions found to

e

~-

constitutionally

repugnant.

The

constitutional iviolation

________.__,

has

I ,)

recurred~ the defendants have therefore failed to keet the first
part of the Davis test and the controversy regarding section 6(4)
is not moot.
B.

Abortifacient Requirements of Sections ll(d) and 2(10)
Section 2(10)

defines abortifacient.

Section ll(d)

re-

quires physicians who administer or prescribe abortifacients to
inform their patients that they are doing so.
peals

found

"foist[]

that

upon

conception."

the

requirement

the pregnant woman

constituted

its

The court also held

The Court of Ap-

view

that

an

that

attempt

to

life begins at

the provision

"not only

intrudes upon the medical discretion of the attending physician,
but it also impermissibly imposes the State's theory of when life
begins
read

.....

t~

upon

the physician • s

patient."

~

Inexplicably,

t_A> statute to require physicians to

the court

inform their patients ?

-._.....

~.-..._..

"abortifacients cause the death of unborn children."
This Court's opinion in Danforth, as elaborated upon in

Akron, construed "informed consent" to mean "the giving of information to the patient as to just what would be done and as to its
consequences."

Akron,

462

is particularly important.
over

-

There

the distinction
~---

is

prescribed

a

broad

u.s.,

--

Here, such information
~l

There is widespread public

b ~~n

-

at 447.

H

"'\

~

,,

......... . . .

confusion ~£

f

1•

''

contracepti_y es and abortifacients.

pharmacological

overlap between

them

"contraceptives" also act as abortifacients).

(widely
Some

women have an understandable wish to avoid fertilization but at
the same time would allow any fertilized egg to progress towards
full term without interference.

7

I believe that the distinction

~

t>.

I

between an abortifacient and a contraceptive is an 'iimportant one,
and that the state's justifiable effort to ensure

~'l at

consent to

------------------------------------

------~
treatment in which
an abortifacient might be used supports these
sections.
Moreover,

section 11 (d)

does not require the physician

to use any particular language or term to describe the "abortifacient."

The physician has broad discretion -

to

~

determine
leaves

the

manner

of

disclosure.

The

provision

"properly

the precise nature and amount of this disclosure to the

physician's discretion and 'medical judgment."'

Akron, supra, at

t Lt::~11
0\,

Unlike the informed consent provisions invalidated in Ak- ~

447.

ron, see id., at 444-445, these sections merely ensure awareness
of a decision about abortion itself,

without touching upon the

"significance" of that decision.
The appellee • s

argument that the Court • s

informed con-

sent decisions should extend only to pregnant women because only
pregnant
merit.

wo~en

were at

issue

in Danforth and

Akron is without

It is a proper use of a state's regulatory police powers

to require disclosure of the effects of an abortifacient, even if
labelled "contraceptive," before prescribing the substance to a
woman.

Such provisions do not "run afoul" of the First Amendment

more than any other disclosure provisions that have been approved
by

the Court.

Nor

do they promote the State • s

theory of 1 i fe

(the physician is not required to use the term "unborn child,"
"fetus," or any other such term).

Although the preamble to the

statute contains a "reaffirmation of the long-standing policy of
this State, that the unborn child is a human being from the time

..

of conception," this is no reason to overturn an b~herwise valid
statutory provision.

Finally,

the traditional

in i ormed consent

doctrines do not alleviate this problem because they apply only
to intrusive medical procedures.

c.

The Court of Appeals' Failure To Adopt a "Saving" Interpretation of Section 6(1) and Its Unconstitutionality
Section 6(1)

makes it a felony for a physician to fail

to use the same care in aborting a viable fetus that the physician would be required to use in bringing a viable fetus to live
birth.

Section 6(1) applies when the fetus is "known to be via-

ble," but does not specify whether the physician is to make this
(The 1984 amendment to section 6(1)

determination of viability.

made the physician's opinion controlling.)
The appellants argue

that

the court of appeals should

have read the statute as allowing the physician's determination
to control.

Since September 1983, the term "viability" has been

defined in section 2 of the act as being determined by "the medical

judgment of

the

attending

physician."

This

definition of

------~~...-

viability is
forth.
1reading

i ~~~ t~ 9_:f ~ni t_ion u~El).d in Dan-

See 428

u.s.,

in a footnote

sian was

at 64.
(no.

The court of appeals dismissed this
5) with the argument that the provi-

not constitutional on

its

face:

"section 6(1)

still

fails to inform the physician as to whose viability determination

I

controls."
Section 2 's definition of

into section 6(1)
whole.

"viable" should not be read

because of the construction of section 6 as a

Section 6 (4)

.....

tracks the language of section 6 (1)

except

expressly states that the physician's determination of viability

8.
I

1'1

is controlling.

An implied incorporation of the section 2 defi-

nition of viability in section 6(1) would make section 6(1)

iden-

tical to section 6(4) and render 6(4) surplusage.
As the Court of Appeals recognized, the unamended statute did not state Uhose determination of

viability~ was

~

to be con-

elusive, and the State therefore had not precisely informed phy-

·
_.

·--

--

sicians of the prohibited conduct.

- ·- · --------...

.......

The court then held that the

vagueness of section 6(1) threatened to chill the exercise of the
physician's best medical judgment and thereby chill the exercise
of

the

woman's

fundamental

right

to

consult

her

doctor

about

abortion and to receive her doctor's unimpeded medical judgment.
I agree that the section is unconstitutional without the amendment.

This Court has repeatedly held that "the determination of

whether a particular fetus is viable is, and must be a matter for
the

judgment of

Parenthood

the

responsible attending physician."

v. Danforth, 428

u.s.

Planned

52, 64 (1976).

The Illinois legislature has subsequently amended section

6(1)

to

~ xpres'si1\ incorporat~ the

definition of viability

contained in section 1.
D.

Method of Abortion Most Likely To Allow Fetal Survival
Section 6 (4)

of section

6 ( 1)

when

possibly viable fetus.

imposes a standard of care similar to that
the physicians per forms

--the same

Under section 6(4)

an abortion on a

. ~ji~a Cla~elo-

ny to fail to observe
standard of care in aborting a
_____---v
possibly viable fetus that the medical team would be required to
observe in bringing that fetus to a live birth.
been

the

subject of a continuous

The section has

injunction since

the

initial

9.
I

1'1

challenge to its constitutionality in 1979.

The court of appeals

found that the section chilled a physician's exercise of unimped-· ~

ed

judgment for

fear

~

believe

that

judgment,

I

this

ot"

.-....._

crimin.alS anctions.

~

--..._

statute

is

___....__.

.--...._-

Although I

do not

~;?

'--

going

to

"impede"

a

physician's

do believe that it impermissibly interfers with the

physician-patient relationship.

The fear

of criminal sanct i ons

might cause a physician to decline to perform an abortion, or to
compromise the care provided to the mother as he attempts to save
the fetus facing immediate and grave danger.
Only a compelling state interest would justify such interference in the woman's exercise of her right to an abortion.
As Ashcroft noted,
tecting

the State has a "compelling interest in pro-

the lives of viable fetuses."

---------462 u.s., at 486.
That

interest will not justify intervention here, however, because the
fetus
ling

is only potentially viable.
interest

justify this
protect

the

in

the

health of

Nor will the State's compel-

the mother,

outlined

in Akron,

interference because the statute does not seek to
health of

the mother.

The

State has presented no

other compelling interest, and therefore the statute is unconstitutional.
E.

Problems in Standing
For the first time,

the appellees in their reply brief

challenge the standing of Diamond and Williams to litigate these
issues on behalf of the state.
adopted appellants • brief
has
only

t '

not,

however,

letter

from

before

explicitly
the

According to appellees, the state

State

the Circuit Court.

The State

taken such a position here.
concerning

the

appeal

before

The
this

10.
''
:1

'l

Court states:

nThe Illinois Attorney General's interest in this

proceeding

is

identical

courts and

is essentially coterminous with the position on the

to

that

advanced

by

it , in

the

lower

issues set forth by the appellants.n
I believe

that because

the State adopted

the brief of

Diamond and Williams below, the description of the State's interest as nidentical to that advanced by it in the lower courts" is
sufficient to allow appellants to claim that they litigate for
the

state.

withdrawing

Certainly
from

the

the

State

cannot
I

litigation.

reasonably

would

therefore

be

seen

treat

as
the

gauzy letter to the clerk as an adoption of appellants' brief.
Moreover, under Supreme Court Rule 10.4, nAll parites to
the proceeding
being

in the court from whose judgment the appeals is

taken shall be deemed parties

appellant shall

notify

the Clerk of

in

this Court,

this Court

unless the

in writing

that one or more of the parties below has no interest in the outcome of the appeal.n

III. CONCLUSION

----

The

court

of

appeals

has

three

hits,

two

runs,

one

error.

Mootness.

The

threat of prosecution

allow the challenge against
6(4)

be affirmed •

'

~

to continue:

sufficient

to

the challenge to

survives because the amendments did not alter the constitu-

tional infirmities.

.

6 ( 1)

is

The judgment of the Court of Appeals should

I

11.

Notice of Abortifacient -- Sections 2(10) · & ll(d).

The

Illinois provision merely required disclosure of the existence
of
_....
the potential abortion.

It had no required disclosure about the

~

significance of the decision to terminate pregnancy.
doctor

broad

..._______

---

discretion .
.

..,

confusion among patients.

It

addressed

an

area of

It gave the
substantial

The Court of Appeals' holding on sec-

tions 2(10) and ll(d) should be reversed.
Saving Interpretation.

?

The court of appeals reached the

same result through a different route, but

~

refusal to adopt

the saving interpretation is logical in light of the entire section 6.

Affirm here.

Unamended section 6(1)

is unconstitutional

~

because it does not allow the attending physician's determination
of viability to control.

Affirm here, too.

Duty of Care in Section 6(4}.

The imposition of a duty

of care on physicians regarding potentially viable fetuses overextends the State's compelling interest in preserving fetal life
and

impermissibly compromises

the quality of care afforded

the

primary patient.

Chinnis

•.

October 15, 1985

:~,·

,,

October 22, 1985
DIAMOND GINA-POW
84-1379

DIAMOND v. CHARLES(CA7)

(Set for November

Sl

MEMO TO FILE
The purpose of this is to aid my memory with respect
to the pertinent sections of the

Illinois abortion laws,

and briefly to state what CA7 held.
tection
J;tlysicians
This

6 (1):

who

Imposes

perform

provision

is

a

standard

abortions

miserably

on

drafted

a

of

care

"viable
and

fetus".

difficult

understand.

CA7, correctly I am inclined to think,

the

void

statute

for

vagueness.

on

It provides

to

held

in summary

(and I paraphrase):
"A person (physician) who terminates the
pregnancy after the fetus is k~ t9 be viable
shall exercise that degree of professional sk f ll
to preserve the life of the fetus as such
physician would be required to exercise to
perserve the life and health of a fetus not
aborted and was to be born".
The
death

section makes
of

failure".

a

violation a

viable
CA7,

fetus
in

or

addition

"class
infant
to

two

felony

results
finding

if

from

the
such

vagueness,

invalidated the statute for the following reasons.

2.
' :,'

l'j
I

Section 6(1)
viable",

but

provides

Thus,

viability.
conduct

applies when the fetus is "known to be

a

crime

no

the
if

standard

section
he

for

determining

could

make

to

observe

failed

a

physician's
appropriate

standards of care in situations where some other physician
reasonably believed
the

Court

interest

of
in

that the fetus was viable.

Appeals

recognized

preserving

fetal

the

life

state's

after

Although
compelling

viability,

it

found that this section inter fer red with the exercise of
medical judgment by the attending physician.
we held

that

the

In Danforth

"determination of whether a particular

fetus is viable is a matter for the responsible attending
physician".

(See Juris. St. A26-29.

Section 6(4):
6(4)

imposes

In another poorly drawn provision, Section
a

similarly

vague

physician who performs an
the

medical

judgment

of

standard

of

care

on

a

abortion when there exists, in
the

a

physician

possibi 1 iy

known to him of more than momentary survival of the fetus,
apart

from

the

body of

the

mother."

Thus,

a

physician

would commit a class three felony if he failed to observe
the same standard of care

,,·•,.

in aborting a possibly viable

3.

,/

fetus

that

he

would

be

required

(under

Section 6 (1}

observe in bringing a viable fetus to live birth".

to

Unlike

Section 6(1}, Section 6(4} regulates not only the abortion
of a viable fetus,
is

but also the abortion of a fetus that
CA7 concluded

potentially viable.

regulates
p:-ior

the

performance

to viability",

of

despite

that

"abortions

Section 6 (4)

that

the holding

is

staged

in Roe v.

Wade

fuat the state's interest in perserving fetal life is not
compelling
direct

prior

to

interference

abortion

with

a

with

a

physician

umimpeded medical judgement.
in

the

form

physican

upon

advice.

In

Akron.

of

criminal

whom
so

Section

viability.

the

finding,

woman's
and

6 ( 4)

right

receive

creates a
to

a

discuss

physician's

The section places obstacles

sanctions

woman

is

CA7

cited

See Juris. St. A. 32, 35.

in

the

entitled
the

path
to

DC's

of

the

rely

for

opinion

in

In addition, CA7 found

that the woman may be unable to exercise her privacy right
because her doctor

refuses to perform an abortion at the

risk of a criminal sanction.
"significantly

burdens

a

This possibility, CA7 held,

woman •s

right

to

terminate her

pregnancy."
~ctions

2(10)

"abortifacient"

and ll(d):
to

mean

Section 2(10) defines the term
"any

instrument,

medicine

or

4.
I

:1

W~k-i ~~4£-w.f (tf,s~)~'~~~·~~~
~ •' ~ ,;...~ ~ ~c~ ~~~~
devise which is known to cause fetal death when employed
------------~

in the customary use for which is manufactured, whether or
not the fetus is known to exist".
Section 11 (d)
or

administer

requires that physicians who prescribe

abortifacients

inform

their

patients

that

they have done so, and a physician who knowingly fails to
informs his patient is guilty of a class C misdemeanor.
These
control,

sections deal with
and

instruments,
<Eath n.
must

medicine

In effect,

inform

birth

Sect ion

the

control

2 ( 10)
or

as

device

refers

devise

I

woman

artificial means of
to

abortifacients

"known

to

understand this,

for

whom he

that

it

is

or

birth

cause

fetal

the physician

she

"known

as

prescribes

to cause

a

fetal

death when employed in the usual and customary manner".
ln both Roe and Akron,

rot have
woman

the power

by

adopting

Danforth,

we

the Court held that states do

to override
one

agreed

theory
that

the
of

the

right of a pregnant

when

state

life
may

begins.
require

In
the

providing of sufficient information for "informed consent"
-

i.e.

that the physic ian should

what will be done
possible
Akron,

(if an abortion is performed)

consequences".
we

inform the woman as to

elaborated

See
on

428

u.s.

Danforth

52,

to

67

and its
n

a.

invalidate

In
a

5.

:~
'l

requirement that the physician must recite a lengthy and
mflexible list of information as to what might happen to
the

we

patient.

mtrude

upon

also

the

held

that

discretion

of

the
the

state

could

pregnant

not

woman's

physician with respect to the medical advice that should
be given.

In this case, the serious flaw - at least so it seems
to me now the

is that the required information may include

substance

abortifacient,
~

of

the

namely,

statutory

that

the

definition

instrument

device

oobstance is one "known to cause fetal death".
Illinois statute adopts
that

life

of
or

Thus, the

the view of the anti-abortionist

begins with conception.

The statute does not

quite say this, but describing the result as "fetal death"
certainly

implies

it.

CA7

construed

-~

incorporating
conception",

the

"state's

rejecting

the

theory
contrary

the

that

definition
life

argument

begins
that

as
at

these

sections "merely require that the physicians notify their
patients that they are prescribing abortifacients, and not
that they will kill their patient's unborn children.

The
statutes

foregoing
at

issue,

is
and

an

incomplete
in

summary

conclusory

terms

of

the
the

6.

reasoning

of

J;articularly

CA7

in

invalidating

interested

in

them.

Cabell's

view

I
as

will

to

be

whether

these sections violate prior decisions of this Court.

I

have not yet read his bench memo.

lppellant's brief -

fairly well written - emphasizes

the state police power to regulate abortions pursuant to
the

compelling

health.
the

state

interest

in

maternal

and

fetal

The brief makes a lawyer like effort to support

Illinois regulations on the ground

that

they do not

violate prior cases.
With respect to Sections 2(10) and ll(d), appellant's
brief

states

fertilization

that
and

"abortifacients

are

not

do

not

contraceptives

since

operate after fertilization has taken place.
of CA7
that

is criticized for
induce

abortion

"contraceptives".

referring

at

This

early
is

to drugs

stages

said

to

of

be

prevent
they

The opinion
and devices
pregnancy
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 84-1379
EUGENE F. DIAMOND AND JASPER F. WILLIAMS,
APPELLANTS v. ALLAN G. CHARLES ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
[February - , 1986]
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant Eugene F. Diamond is a pediatrician engaged in
private practice in Illinois. He seeks to defend before this
Court the constitutionality of four sections of the Illinois
Abortion Law of 1975, as amended. 1 These sections impose
criminal liability for the performance of an abortion under
certain circumstances, and, under other circumstances, require that the woman be provided with particular abortionrelated information. The State of Illinois has chosen to absent itself from this appeal, despite the fact that its statute is
at stake. Because a private party whose own conduct is neither implicated nor threatened by a criminal statute has no
judicially cognizable interest in the statute's defense, we dis....____
miss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

I
On October 30, 1979, over gubernatorial veto, the Illinois
Legislature amended the State's 1975 abortion law to provide
for increased regulation. 1979 Ill. Laws, Pub. Act 81-1078.
That very day appellees, four physicians who provide obstet1
1975 Ill. Laws, Pub. Act 79-1126, as amended, now codified as Ill. Rev.
Stat. ch. 38, ~~ 81-21 to 81-34 (1983). The 1975 Act was passed over the
Governor's veto. Substantial portions of it already have been ruled to be
unconstitutional. See, e. g. , Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302 (ND Ill.
1978), aff'd sub nom. Wynn v. Carey, 599 F. 2d 193 (CA7 1979).
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ric, gynecologic, and abortion services in Illinois, filed a class
action in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois. They alleged a deprivation of rights in
violation of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 by the Illinois officials charged
with enforcing the Abortion Law. 2 Appellees sought declaratory and injunctive relief. 3
The next day, the District Court certified the plaintiff class
and temporarily restrained enforcement of the entire statute.
On November 8, appellant Diamond filed a motion to intervene as a party defendant, either permissively or as of right,
and to be appointed guardian ad litem for infants who survive
abortion. 4 The motion for intervention professed to be
based on Doctor Diamond's conscientious objection to abortions, and on his status as a pediatrician and as a parent of an
unemancipated minor daughter. 5

'

2
The defendants named in the complaint were the Attorney General of
the State and the Director of the Illinois Department of Public Health, each
in his official capacity, and the State's Attorney of Cook County, in both his
official capacity and as representative of a class consisting of the State's
Attorneys in all the counties of the State of Illinois. A suit against a state
officer in his official capacity is, of course, a suit against the State. See
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. - - , - - (1985) (slip op. 6). The District Court certified a defendant class of State's Attorneys. Charles v.
Carey, Civ. No. 79C 4541 (ND Ill., Oct. 31, 1979).
8
On the same day another and similar action was filed in the same court
by three other Illinois obstetrician-gynecologists and two Illinois clinics
that provide abortion services. The two suits were consolidated by court
order on Nov. 14, 1979.
• Doctor Diamond's Motion to Intervene and for Appointment of Guardian was joined by Doctor Jasper F. Williams, and David K. Campbell.
Doctor Williams, a physician engaged in private practice in Illinois, in the
alternative sought appointment as guardian ad litem for unborn children
subject to abortion. We are advised that Doctor Williams died on April
15, 1985, after the filing of the notice of appeal to this Court. No one has
been substituted for him. Mr. Campbell, who sought intervention as the
spouse of a woman of childbearing age, did not file or join a notice of appeal
to this Court.
5
Diamond claimed that under the Abortion Law as a whole fewer abortions would be performed, and that those performed in accordance with the

x....

I *t
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Over appellees' objection, the District Court granted Diamond's motion to intervene. 6 The District Court did not indicate whether the intervention was permissive or as of right
and it did not describe how Diamond's interests in the litigation satisfied the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 24 for
intervenor status. The court denied the guardianship
motion.
On November 16, the District Court entered a preliminary
injunction against a number of sections of the Abortion Law,
including §§ 6(1) and 6(4). 7 These sections prescribe the
standard of care that must be exercised by a physician in performing an abortion of a viable fetus, 8 and of a possibly viable
Abortion Law would be designed to preserve the life of aborted fetuses,
resulting in more live births. Diamond also rested his motion for intervention on § 13 of the Abortion Law, which provides that a physician who
refuses to perform abortions based on conscientious objections will not be
subject to liability. He relied, furthermore, on § ll(a), to the effect that
violations of the Abortion Law constitute unprofessional conduct, and on
§ 3.3, which provides for parental consultation.
6
Although the Motion to Intervene was on behalf of Doctor Diamond,
Doctor Williams, and Mr. Campbell, see n. 4, supra, the District Court
granted leave to intervene to Americans United for Life Legal Defense
Fund, counsel for the intervenors below, and for Diamond before this
Court.
7
The preliminary injunction also applied to the following sections: § 2(2)
(defining "viability"); § 3.3 (parental consultation); § 3.4 (spousal consultation); § 3.5(2), in part (the portion requiring that the patient be told, inter
alia, that "The State of Illinois wants you to know that in its view the child
you are carrying is a living human being whose life should be preserved.
Illinois strongly encourages you not to have an abortion but to go through
to childbirth"); § 4 (abortion subsequent to first trimester); §§ 5(1), (2), and
(3) (definition of "viability"); § 9 (prohibition of saline amniocentesis after
first trimester); § 10(i) (certification as to nonviability or as to medical indicators for abortion when fetus was viable); § 10(j) (reporting requirements
for saline amniocentesis); § lO(l), in part (the reporting requirement as to
the basis for a judgment concerning the existence of a medical emergency);
and § 12, in part (the third sentence, prohibiting experimentation with or
exploitation of fetal tissue).
8
6(1) then provided:

84-1379-0PINION
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fetus. 9 A violator of § 6(1) is subject to a term of imprisonment of between three and seven years and a fine not exceeding $10,000. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ~~ 1005-8-1(5) and
1005-9-1(1) (1983). A violator of§ 6(4) is subject to a term of
imprisonment of between two and five years and a fine not
exceeding $10,000. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ~~ 1005-8-1(6)
and 1005-9-1(1) (1983).
"No person who intentionally terminates a pregnancy after the fetus is
known to be viable shall intentionally fail to exercise that degree of professional skill, care and diligence to preserve the life and health of the fetus
which such person would be required to exercise in order to preserve the
life and health of any fetus intended to be born and not aborted. Any physician or person assisting in such a pregnancy termination who shall intentionally fail to take such measures to encourage or to sustain the life of a
fetus known to be viable before or after birth commits a Class 2 felony if
the death of a viable fetus or infant results from such failure." Ill. Rev.
Stat., ch. 38, ~ 81-26 (1983).
On June 30, 1984, the Illinois Legislature amended § 6(1), overriding another veto of the Governor. 1984 Ill. Laws, Pub. Act 83-1128, § 1. The
Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of § 6(1) as it appeared
prior to the 1984 amendment. See Charles v. Daley, 749 F. 2d 452, 455
(CA7 1984).
9
Section 6(4) then provided:
"No person who intentionally terminates a pregnancy shall intentionally
fail to exercise that degree of professional skill, care and diligence to preserve the life and health of the fetus which such person would be required
to exercise in order to preserve the life and health of any fetus intended to
be born and not aborted when there exists, in the medical judgment of the
physician performing the pregnancy termination based on the particular
facts of the case before him, a possibility known to him of sustained survival of the fetus apart from the body of the mother, with or without artificial support. Any physician or person assisting in such pregnancy termination who shall intentionally fail to take such measures to encourage or
sustain the life of such a fetus, before or after birth, is guilty of a Class 3
felony if the death of a viable fetus or an infant results from such failure."
Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ~ 81-26 (1983).
Section 6(4) was amended by the 1984 statute cited in n. 8, supra, but the
Court of Appeals assessed its constitutionality, also, on the version quoted
above. See Charles v. Daley, 749 F. 2d, at 455.

1

l

]
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The plaintiffs appealed the denial of the preliminary injunction as to § 2(10), which defines the term "abortifacient," 10
and as to § ll(d), which requires a physician who prescribes
an abortifacient to tell the patient what it is. 11 A violator of
§ ll(d) is subject to a term of imprisonment of not more than
30 days, and a fine not exceeding $500. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch.
38, ~~ 1005-8-3(1) and 1005-9-1(3) (1983). No cross-appeal
was taken. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit instructed the District Court to enter a preliminary injunctio
as to §§ 2(10) and ll(d), because these statutory provision
forced physicians "to act as the mouthpiece for the State'
theory of life." Charles v. Carey, 627 F. 2d 772, 789 (1980). 12
On remand, the District Court permanently enjoined,1
among others, §§6(4), 2(10), and ll(d). Charles v. Carey,
579 F. Supp. 464 (ND Ill. 1983). 13 On appeal and cross-ap10
Section 2(10) provides:
"'Abortifacient' means any instrument, medicine, drug, or any other
substance or device which is known to cause fetal death when employed in
the usual and customary use for which it is manufactured, whether or not
the fetus is known to exist when such substance or device is employed."
Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, 1!81-22 (1983).
11
Section ll(d) provides in relevant part:
"Any person who prescribes or administers any instrument, medicine,
drug or other substance or device, which he knows to be an abortifacient,
and which is in fact an abortifacient, and intentionally, knowingly or recklessly fails to inform the person for whom it is prescribed or upon whom it
is administered that it is an abortifacient commits a Class C misdemeanor."
Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, 1!81-31 (1983).
12
The Court of Appeals instructed the District Court also to enter a preliminary injunction against the following sections: § 3.2(A)(1)(a)(iii);
§ 3.5(2); § 6(6); § 3.2(A)(l)(a) (defining the terms "by the physician who is to
perform the abortion" and "the woman is provided at least 24 hours before
the abortion"); § 3.2(A)(1)(b) (defining the term "from the physician at least
24 hours before the abortion is to be performed"); § 3.2(B)(1) (waiver of
waiting period); § 10(k) (reporting requirement for waiver of the waiting
period);§ 3.2(A)(l)(a) (defining the term "with a true copy of her pregnancy
test results"); and § 6(2). See 627 F. 2d, at 792, and n. 36.
13
Other sections of the Abortion Law had been preliminarily enjoined

--

.

~-~
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84-1379--0PINION

DIAMOND v. CHARLES

6
•·.

peal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the entry of the permanent injunction as to the three sections, and also permanently
enjoined §6(1). 749 F. 2d 452 (CA7 1984). The State did
not appeal the grant of the permanent injunction. Diamond,
however, filed a notice of appeal to this Court and a jurisdictional statement. As we have indicated, see n. 4, supra, Dr.
Diamond is the sole appellant here. We noted probable jurisdiction. --U.S.-- (1985).
The State, through the office ofjts Attorney-:peneryl, subsequently filed with this Court-a "letter of interest," invoking
our Rule 10.4, which provides: "All parties to the proceeding
in the court from whose jud-ginent the appeal is being taken
shall be deemed parties in this Court . . . ." In that letter
Illinois stated:
"Although not an appellant, the Office of the Attorney
General ... is a party in the United States Supreme
Court and is designated an appellee. The Illinois Attorney General's interest in this proceeding is identical to
that advanced by it in the lower courts and is essentially
co-terminous with the position on the issues set forth by
the appellants." Letter dated July 15, 1985, to the
Clerk of the Court from the Director of Advocacy, Office
of the Attorney General of Illinois. See App. to Reply
Brief for Appellants A-1.
Illinois' absence as an appellant requires that we examine oyr
jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.
-

----------

Article III of the Constitution limits the power of federal
courts to deciding "cases" and "controversies." This requirement ensures the presence of the "concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constituunder a separate opinion by the District Court following remand.
Charles v. Carey, 579 F. Supp. 377 (ND Ill. 1983).

See

I
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tional questions." Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962).
The presence of a disagreement, however sharp and acrimonious it may be, is insufficient by itself to meet Art. III's requirements. This Court consistently has required, in addition, that the party seeking judicial resolution of a dispute
"show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of
the defendant." Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,
441 U. S. 91, 99 (1979); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S.
490, 501 (1975).
In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United
for Separation of Church and State, 454 U. S. 464, 473
(1982), the Court observed: "The exercise of judicial power
... can so profoundly affect the lives, liberty, and property
of those to whom it extends" that the decision to seek review
must be placed "in the hands of those who have a direct stake
in the outcome." Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 740
(1972). It is not to be placed in the hands of "concerned bystanders." United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S. 669, 687
(1973).
III
Had the State of Illinois invoked this Court's appellate jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(2) and sought review of
the Court of Appeals' decision, the "case" or "controversy"
requirement would have been met, for a State has standing
to defend the constitutionality of its statute. Diamond argues that Illinois' "letter of interest" demonstrates the
State's continued concern with the enforcement of its Abortion Law, and renders the State the functional equivalent of
an appellant. Accordingly, Diamond asserts, there is no jurisdictional problem in the case. This claim must be
rejected.
It is true that, as a party below, the State remains a party_
h~':_~ ~~l.!l" Rule 10.:4 '4 But statuSiiS a "party" does not
14

The purpose of the Rule is to provide a means for a party below, who

''

' I

'

'!

.,'•
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equate with status as an appellant. To appear before the
Court as an appellant, a party must file a notice of a peal, the
statutory prerequisite to mvoking is ourt's jurisdiction.
.§
See 2
I mois mere expression of interest
is insufficient to bring the State into the suit as an appellant.
By not appealing the judgment below, the State indicated its
acceptance of that decision, and its lack of interest in defending its own statute. 16 The State's general interest may be
adverse to the interests of appellees, but its failure to invoke
our jurisdiction leaves the Court without a "case" or "controversy" between appellees and the State of Illinois. Cf.
Princeton University v. Schmid, 455 U. S. 100 (1982).
Had the State sought review, this Court's Rule 10.4 makes
clear that Diamond, as an intervening defendant below, also

----~

was not notified that this Court's review has been sought by another party,
to make its interests known to the Court. Frequently, an appellant would
seek review as to only one party below, permitting the judgment to stand
as to others. See R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice,
§ 6-20 (5th ed. 1978), and § 6.35 (3d ed. 1962) (describing evolution of the
Rule). This Court's Rule 10.4 therefore avoids the adjudication of rights
in a party's absence, but it does not provide a means to obtain review when
there has been no filing by that party of a notice of appeal.
1
& 28 U. S. C. § 2107 provides that, with specified exceptions, "no appeal
shall bring any judgment, order or decree in an action, suit or proceeding
of a civil nature before a court of appeals for review unless notice of appeal
is filed, within thirty days after the entry of such judgment, order or
decree."
16
The State's reasons for abandoning this suit are not articulated in the
record. We have noted above, however, that, during the pendency of this
case before the Court of Appeals, Illinois again amended its Abortion Law.
1984 Ill. Laws, Pub. Act 83-1128. At the time of the Court of Appeals'
decision, which was based on the pre-amendment version of the Abortion
Law, the amended sections were subject to a temporary restraining order.
See Keith v. Daley, No. 84 C 5602 (ND Ill. 1984). The Court of Appeals
declined to assess the constitutionality of the 1984 amendments and rejected challenges of mootness based on those amendments. Charles v.
Daley, 749 F. 2d, at 455, 457-458. The State's inaction may well be due to
its concern with the amended, not the earlier, form of the statutes under
attack.
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would be entitled to seek review, enabling him to file a brief
on the merits, and to seek leave to argue orally. But this
ability to ride "piggyback" on the State's undoubted standing
exists only if the State is in fact an appellant before the
Court; in the absence of the State in that capacity, there is no
case for Diamond to join.
IV
A
Diamond claims that his interests in enforcement permits
him to defend the Abortion Law, despite Illinois' acquiescence in the Court of Appeals' ruling of unconstitutionality.
This claim also must fail. D~amondJ attempts to
equate his position with that of appellees~ysicians who
instituted this suit in the District Court. Appellees, however, had standing to bring suit against the state officials who
were charged with enforcing the Abortion Law because appellees faced possible criminal prosecution. See, e. g., Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179, 188 (1973). The conflict between
state officials empowered to enforce a law and private parties
subject to prosecution under that law is a classic "case" or
"controversy" within the meaning of Art. III.
The conflict presented by Diamond is different. Were the
Abortion Law to be held constitutional, Diamond could not
compel the State to enforce it against appellees because "a
private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the
prosecution or nonprosecution of another." Linda R. S. v.
Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 619 (1973); see Leeke v.
Timmerman, 454 U. S. 83 (1981); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB,
- - U. S. - - (1984). See also Younger v. Harris, 401
U. S. 37, 42 (1971); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31, 33
(1962). Cf. Allen v. Wright,- U . S . - , - (slip op.
16) (1984) ("an asserted right to have the Government act in
accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer jurisdiction on a federal court").
The concerns for state autonomy that deny private individuals the right to compel a State to enforce its laws apply with
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even greater force to an attempt by a private individual to
compel a State to create and retain the legal framework
within which individual enforcement decisions are made.
The State's acquiescence in the Court of Appeals' determination of unconstitutionality serves to deprive the State of the
power to prosecute anyone for violating the Abortion Law.
Diamond's attempt to maintain the litigation is then simply
an effort to compel the State to enact a code in accord with
Diamond's interests. But "the power to create and enforce a
legal code, both civil and criminal" is one of the quintessential
functions of a State. Alfred L . Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto
Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U. S. 592, 601 (1982). Because the
State alone is entitled to create a legal code, only the State
has the kind of "direct stake" identified in Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U. S., at 740, in defending the standards embodied in that code.
B
Even if there were circumstances in which a private party
would have standing to defend the constitutionality of a challenged statute, 17 this is not one of them. Diamond is not able
to assert an injury in fact. A physician has standing to challenge an abortion law that poses for him a threat of criminal
prosecution. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S., at 188; see Planned
Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 62
(1976). In addition, a physician w~emonstrates that abortion funding regulations have a direct financial impact on his
practice may assert the constitutional rights of other individuals who are unable to assert their rights themselves. See
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106 (1975). Diamond attempts
to assert an equivalent interest based upon his personal status as a doctor, a father, and a protector of the unborn. We
17
The Illinois Legislature, of course, has the power to create new interests, the invasion of which may confer standing. In such a case, the requirements of Art. III may be met. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 41, n. 22 (1976).
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must reject Diamond's claims that his personal and professional interests confer standing.
Diamond, who is a pediatrician, claims that if the Abortion
Law were enforced, he would gain patients; fewer abortions
would be performed and those that would be performed
would result in more live births, because the law requires a
physician to attempt to preserve the life of the aborted fetus.
By implication, therefore, the pool of potential fee-paying patients would be enlarged. The possibilities that such fetuses
would survive and then find their way as patients to Diamond
are speculative, and "unadorned speculation will not suffice
to invoke the federal judicial power." Simon v. Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S., at 44. Diamond's
situation, based on speculation and hoped-for fees is far different from that of the respondent-physicians in Wulff,
supra, where actual fees were limited by the challenged Missouri statute.
Diamond also alleges that, as a physician, he has standing
to litigate the standards of medical practice that ought to be
applied to the performance of abortions. Diamond's purported interest rests on § ll(a) of the Abortion Law, which
provides that the requirements of that law constitute the
standards of conduct for the medical profession. Since that
provision is neither before the Court nor integrally related to
any of the sections at issue in this proceeding, it cannot confer standing on Diamond. Although Diamond's allegation
may be cloaked in the nomenclature of a special professional
interest, it is simply the expression of a desire that the Illinois Abortion Law as written be obeyed. Article III requires more than simply a desire to vindicate value interests.
See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S. 669, 687 (1973). It
requires an "injury in fact" which distinguishes "a person
with a direct stake in the outcome of a litigation-even
though small-from a person with a mere interest in the
problem." ld., at 689, n. 14. Diamond has an interest, but
no direct stake, in the abortion process. This "abstract con-

..

·'

.j

''
~~

.,1

I·

84-1379-0PINION

12

DIAMOND v. CHARLES

cern . . . does not substitute for the concrete injury required
by Art. III." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U. S., at 40. Similarly, Diamond's claim of conscientious objection to abortion does not provide a judicially
cognizable interest.
Doctor Diamond also asserts that he has standing as the fa- ~
ther a daughter of childbearing years. First, to the extent that Diamond's c aim aerives from § 3(3) of the Abortion
Law, the parental notification section, he lacks standing to
continue this litigation, for it does not address the validity of
that provision. Second, to the extent that he claims an interest in ensuring that his daughter is not prescribed an
abortifacient without prior information-a concern ostensibly
triggered by the invalidation of §§ 2(10) and ll(d)-he has
failed to show that he is a proper person to advance this claim
on her behalf. Diamond has not shown either that his
daughter is currently a minor or that she is otherwise incapable of asserting her own rights. Diamond's failure to adduce
factual support renders him incapable of maintaining this appeal in his capacity as a parent. See Bender v. Williamsport
Area School District, - - U. S. - - , - - (1986) (STEVENS,
J., concurring in the judgment) (slip op. 13).
Nor can Diamond assert the constitutional rights of the unborn fetus. 18 The interest in protecting otentiallife belongs
exclusively to the State. See ett v. a ey, 764 . 2d 1265,
1271 TCK~enied (as to interlocutory review) sub
nom. Illinois Pro-Life Coalition, Inc. v. Keith, - - U. S.
- - (1985), ("it is the state alone who can assert an interest
in the unborn"). Unly the -state may invoke regulatory
mea~protect that interest and only the State may in-

I

18

Diamond claims that he is asserting the rights of his prospective patients, who survive abortion, to be born with as few handicapping conditions as possible. Diamond asserted this claim before the District Court
as a basis for being appointed guardian ad litem for unborn fetuses. That
claim was rejected by the District Court.
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voke the power of the courts when those regulatory measures are subject to challenge.

v
Finally, Diamond asserts that he has standing based on
two interests that relate not to the Abortion Law, but to his
involvement in this litigation. Neither interest suffices.
A
Diamond's status as an intervenor below, whether permissive or as of right, does not confer standing sufficient to keep
the case alive in the absence of the State on this appeal. Although intervenors are considered parties entitled, among
other things, to seek review by this Court, Mine Workers v.
Eagle-Picher Co., 325 U. S. 335, 338 (1945), an intervenor's
right to continue a suit in the absence of the party on whose
side intervention was permitted is contingent upon a showing
by the intervenor that he fulfills the requirements of Art. III.
See id., at 339. See also Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U. S. 352,
368 (1980).
This Court has recognized that certain public concerns may
constitute an adequate "interest" within the meaning of Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 24(a)(2), see Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v.
El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U. S. 129, 135 (1967), and has
held that an interest under Rule 24(a)(2), which provides for
intervention as of right, 19 requires a "significantly protectable interest." See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S.
517, 531 (1971). However, the precise relationship between
the interest required to satisfy the Rule and the interest required to confer standing, has led to anomalous decisions in
19

Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(a)(2) provides for intervention
"(2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties."

·'
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the Courts of Appeals. 20 We need not decide today whether
a party seeking to intervene before a District Court must satisfy not only the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2), but also the
requirements of Art. III. To continue this suit in the absence of Illinois, Diamond himself must satisfy the requirements of Art. III. The interests Diamond asserted before
the District Court in seeking to intervene plainly are insufficient to confer standing on him to continue this suit now.
B
At oral argument, Diamond stated that the District Court
has assessed attorney's fees against him and the State,
jointly and severally. This fee award, Diamond asserted,
provided the requisite standing to litigate this case:
"The standing or the real controversy thus between the
parties to this case is a very real sum of money, a judgment that runs in favor of the individual plaintiff physicians in this case and against the individual defendants
intervenors whom I represent." Tr. of Oral Arg. 4.
Diamond is claiming that an award of fees entered after a decision on the merits by the District Court and the Court of
Appeals, and after probable jurisdiction had been noted by
this Court, gives him a direct stake in the enforcement of the
20
The Courts of Appeals have reached varying conclusions as to whether
a party seeking to intervene as of right must himself possess standing.
Compare United States v. 39.36 Acres of Land, 754 F. 2d 855, 859 (CA7
1985), petn. for cert. pending sub nom. Save the Dunes Council, Inc. v.
United States, No. 85-426 (intervention requires an interest in excess of
that required for standing), with Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Kelley, 241 U. S. App. D. C. 340, 747 F. 2d 777 (1984) (equating
interest necessary to intervene with interests necessary to confer standing), and United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 206 U. S. App. D. C.
317,642 F. 2d 1285 (1980) (intervention is proper only if the would-be intervenor has an interest in the outcome of the suit different from that of the
public as a whole) with Sagebush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F. 2d 525
(CA9 1983) (resolving intervention questions without reference to standing
doctrine) and Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, Inc . v. Citizens for Community Action, 558 F. 2d 861 (CA8 1977) (same).
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Illinois Abortion Law. In short, because Diamond stands to
lose the amount of the fee unless the State's regulations concerning abortion are reinstated, he claims he has been injured by the invalidation of those regulations. 21
But Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U. S., at 472,
makes clear that Art. III standing requires an injury with a
nexus to the substantive character of the statute or regulation at issue:
"[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the
party who invokes the court's authority to 'show that he
personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury
as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,' Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441
U. S. 91, 99 (1979), and that the injury 'fairly can be
traced to the challenged action' and is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision,' Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 38, 41 (1976)."
Any liability for fees is, of course, a consequence of Diamond's decision to intervene, but it cannot fairly be traced to
the Illinois Abortion Law. The fee award is wholly unrelated to the subject matter of the litigation, and bears no relation to the statute whose constitutionality is at issue here.
It is true, that were the Court to resolve the case on the merits against appellees, appellees would no longer be "prevailing parties" entitled to an award of fees under 42 U. S. C.
§ 1988. But the mere fact that continued adjudication would
21
While not detenninative of the standing claim in this case, Diamond
responded to the fee award by filing a motion to dismiss him from the litigation and name Americans United for Life, Inc., as the sole intervenor.
See n. 6, supra. In the alternative, Diamond asked the District Court to
clarify the original intervention order by stating that "AUL is an intervening defendant for all purposes, including the assessment of attorney's
fees." The motion further stated that "AUL is the real party in interest."
In assessing fees against appellant Diamond, the District Court stated that
"the State defendants and intervenors played at least equal roles in defending the abortion statute." Charles v. Daley, No. 79-C-4541 (ND Ill. Apr.

22, 1985).
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provide a remedy for an injury that is only a byproduct of the
suit itself does not mean that the injury is cognizable under
Art. III.
VI
The State of Illinois, by failing to appeal, has indicated no
direct interest in upholding the four sections of the Abortion
Law at issue here. Diamond has stepped in, attempting to
maintain the litigation abandoned by the State in which he resides. Because he lacks any judicially cognizable interest in
the Abortion Law, his appeal is dismissed for want of
jurisdiction.
It is so ordered.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 84-1379

EUGENE F. DIAMOND AND JASPER F. WILLIAMS,
APPELLANTS v. ALLAN G. CHARLES ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
[March - , 1986]

JusTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant Eugene F. Diamond is a pediatrician engaged in
private practice in Illinois. He seeks to defend before this
Court the constitutionality of four sections of the Illinois
Abortion Law of 1975, as amended. 1 These sections impose
criminal liability for the performance of an abortion under
certain circumstances, and, under other circumstances, require that the woman be provided with particular abortionrelated information. The State of Illinois has chosen to absent itself from this appeal, despite the fact that its statute is
at stake. Because a private party whose own conduct is neither implicated nor threatened by a criminal statute has no
judicially cognizable interest in the statute's defense, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
I
On October 30, 1979, over gubernatorial veto, the Illinois
Legislature amended the State's 1975 abortion law to provide
for increased regulation. 1979 Ill. Laws, Pub. Act 81-1078.
That very day appellees, four physicians who provide obstet' 1975 Ill. Laws, Pub. Act 79-1126, as amended, now codified as Ill. Rev.
Stat. ch. 38, ~~ 81-21 to 81-34 (1983). The 1975 Act was passed over the
Governor's veto. Substantial portions of it already have been held to be
unconstitutional. See, e. g., Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302 (ND Ill.
1978), aff'd sub nom. Wynn v. Carey, 599 F. 2d 193 (CA7 1979).
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ric, gynecologic, and abortion services in Illinois, filed a class
action in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois. They alleged a deprivation of rights in
violation of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 by the Illinois officials charged
with enforcing the Abortion Law. 2 Appellees sought declaratory and injunctive relief. 3
The next day, the District Court certified the plaintiff class
and temporarily restrained enforcement of the entire statute.
On November 8, appellant Diamond filed a motion to intervene as a party defendant, either permissively or as of right,
and to be appointed guardian ad litem for fetuses who survive abortion. 4 The motion for intervention professed to be
based on Doctor Diamond's conscientious objection to abortions, and on his status as a pediatrician and as a parent of an
unemancipated minor daughter. 5
2
The defendants named in the complaint were the Attorney General of
the State and the Director of the Illinois Department of Public Health, each
in his official capacity, and the State's Attorney of Cook County, in both his
official capacity and as representative of a class consisting of the State's
Attorneys in all the counties of the State of Illinois. A suit against a state
officer in his official capacity is, of course, a suit against the State. See
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. - - , - - (1985) (slip op. 6). The District Court certified a defendant class of State's Attorneys. Charles v.
Carey, Civ. No. 79C 4541 (ND Ill., Oct. 31, 1979).
3
On the same day another and similar action was filed in the same court
by three other Illinois obstetrician-gynecologist s and two Illinois clinics
that provide abortion services. The two suits were consolidated by court
order on Nov. 14, 1979.
' Doctor Diamond's Motion to Intervene and for Appointment of Guardian was joined by Doctor Jasper F. Williams, and David K. Campbell.
Doctor Williams , a physician engaged in private practice in Illinois, in the
alternative sought appointment as guardian ad litem for unborn children
subject to abortion. We are advised that Doctor Williams died on April
15. 1985, after the filing of the notice of appeal to this Court. No one has
been substituted for him. Mr. Campbell, who sought intervention as the
spouse of a woman of childbearing age, did not file or join a notice of appeal
to this Court.
' Diamond claimed that under the Abortion Law as a whole fewer abortions would he performed, and that those performed in accordance with the
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Over appellees' objection, the District Court granted
Diamond's motion to intervene. 6 The District Court did not
indicate whether the intervention was permissive or as of
right and it did not describe how Diamond's interests in the
litigation satisfied the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 24
for intervenor status. The court denied the guardianship
motion.
On November 16, the District Court entered a preliminary
injunction against a number of sections of the Abortion Law,
including §§ 6(1) and 6( 4). 7 These sections prescribe the
standard of care that must be exercised by a physician in
performing an abortion of a viable fetus, 8 and of a possibly
Abortion Law would be designed to preserve the life of aborted fetuses,
resulting in more live births. Diamond also rested his motion for intervention on § 13 of the Abortion Law, which provides that a physician who
refuses to perform abortions based on conscientious objections will not be
subject to liability. He relied, furthermore, on § ll(a), to the effect that
violations of the Abortion Law constitute unprofessional conduct, and on
§ 3.3, which provides for parental consultation.
6
Although the Motion to Intervene was on behalf of Doctor Diamond,
Doctor Williams, and Mr. Campbell, see n. 4, supra, the District Court
granted leave to intervene to Americans United for Life Legal Defense
Fund, counsel for the intervenors below and for Diamond before this
Court.
7
The preliminary injunction also applied to the following sections: § 2(2)
(defining "viability"); § 3.3 (parental consultation); § 3.4 (spousal consultation); § 3.5(2), in part (the portion requiring that the patient be told, inter
alia, that "The State of Illinois wants you to know that in its view the child
you are carrying is a living human being whose life should be preserved.
Illinois strongly encourages you not to have an abortion but to go through
to childbirth"); § 4 (abortion subsequent to first trimester); §§ 5(1), (2), and
(3) (definition of "viability"); § 9 (prohibition of saline amniocentesis after
first trimester); § 10(i) (certification as to nonviability or as to medical indicators for abortion when fetus was viable); § 10(j) (reporting requirements
for saline amniocentesis); § lO(l), in part (the reporting requirement as to
the basis for a judgment concerning the existence of a medical emergency);
and § 12, in part (the third sentence, prohibiting experimentation with or
exploitation of fetal tissue).
8
6(1) then provided:
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viable fetus. 9 A violator of § 6(1) is subject to a term of
imprisonment of between three and seven years and a fine
not exceeding $10,000. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ~~ 1005-8-1(5)
and 1005-9-1(1) (1983). A violator of § 6(4) is subject to a
term of imprisonment of between two and five years and a
fine not exceeding $10,000.
Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38,
~~ 1005-8-1(6) and 1005-9-1(1) (1983).
"No person who intentionally terminates a pregnancy after the fetus is
known to be viable shall intentionally fail to exercise that degree of professional skill, care and diligence to preserve the life and health of the fetus
which such person would be required to exercise in order to preserve the
life and health of any fetus intended to be born and not aborted. Any physician or person assisting in such a pregnancy termination who shall intentionally fail to take such measures to encourage or to sustain the life of a
fetus known to be viable before or after birth commits a Class 2 felony if
the death of a viable fetus or infant results from such failure." Ill. Rev.
Stat., ch. 38, ~ 81-26 (1983).
On June 30, 1984, the Illinois Legislature amended § 6(1), overriding another veto of the Governor. 1984 Ill. Laws, Pub. Act 83-1128, § 1. The
Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of § 6(1) as it appeared
prior to the 1984 amendment. See Charles v. Daley, 749 F. 2d 452, 455
(CA7 1984).
9
Section 6(4) then provided:
"No person who intentionally terminates a pregnancy shall intentionally
fail to exercise that degree of professional skill, care and diligence to preserve the life and health of the fetus which such person would be required
to exercise in order to preserve the life and health of any fetus intended to
be born and not aborted when there exists, in the medical judgn1ent of the
physician performing the pregnancy termination based on the particular
facts of the case before him, a possibility known to him of sustained survival of the fetus apart from the body of the mother, with or without artificial support. Any physician or person assisting in such pregnancy termination who shall intentionally fail to take such measures to encourage or
sustain the life of such a fetus, before or after birth, is guilty of a Class 3
felony if the death of a viable fetus or an infant results from such failure."
Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ~ 81-26 (1983).
Section 6(4) was amended by the 1984 statute cited inn. 8, supra, but the
Court of Appeals assessed its constitutionality on the version quoted
above. See Charles v. Daley, 749 F. 2d, at 455.
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The plaintiffs appealed the denial of the preliminary injunction as to § 2(10), which defines the term "abortifacient," 10
and as to § ll(d), which requires a physician who prescribes
an abortifacient to tell the patient what it is. 11 A violator of
§ ll(d) is subject to a term of imprisonment of not more than
30 days, and a fine not exceeding $500. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch.
38, ~~ 1005-8-3(1) and 1005-9-1(3) (1983). No cross-appeal
was taken. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit instructed the District Court to enter a preliminary injunction
as to §§ 2(10) and ll(d), because these statutory provisions
forced physicians "to act as the mouthpiece for the State's
theory of life." Charles v. Carey, 627 F. 2d 772, 789 (1980). 12
On remand, the District Court permanently enjoined,
among others, §§ 6(4), 2(10), and ll(d). Charles v. Carey,
579 F. Supp. 464 (ND Ill. 1983). 13 On appeal and cross10
Section 2(10) provides:
"'Abortifacient' means any instrument, medicine, drug, or any other
substance or device which is known to cause fetal death when employed in
the usual and customary use for which it is manufactured, whether or not
the fetus is known to exist when such substance or device is employed."
Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ~ 81-22 (1983).
11
Section ll(d) provides in relevant part:
"Any person who prescribes or administers any instrument, medicine,
drug or other substance or device, which he knows to be an abortifacient,
and which is in fact an abortifacient, and intentionally, knowingly or recklessly fails to inform the person for whom it is prescribed or upon whom it
is administered that it is an abortifacient commits a Class C misdemeanor."
Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ~ 81-31 (1983).
12
The Court of Appeals instructed the District Court also to enter
a preliminary injunction against the following sections: § 3.2(A)(l)(a)(iii);
§ 3.5(2); § 6(6); § 3.2(A)(1)(a) (defining the terms "by the physician who is to
perform the abortion" and "the woman is provided at least 24 hours before
the abortion"); § 3.2(A)(1)(b) (defining the term "from the physician at least
24 hours before the abortion is to be performed"); § 3.2(B)(1) (waiver of
waiting period); § 10(k) (reporting requirement for waiver of the waiting
period);§ 3.2(A)(1)(a) (defining the term "with a true copy of her pregnancy
test results"); and § 6(2). See 627 F. 2d, at 792, and n. 36.
13
Other sections of the Abortion Law had been preliminarily enjoined
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appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the entry of the permanent injunction as to the three sections, and also permanently
enjoined §6(1). 749 F. 2d 452 (CA7 1984). The State did
not appeal the grant of the permanent injunction. Diamond,
however, filed a notice of appeal to this Court and a jurisdictional statement. As we have indicated, see n. 4, supra,
Doctor Diamond is the sole appellant here. We noted probable jurisdiction. 471 U. S. - - (1985).
The State, through the office of its Attorney General, subsequently filed with this Court a "letter of interest," invoking
our Rule 10.4, which provides: "All parties to the proceeding
in the court from whose judgment the appeal is being taken
shall be deemed parties in this Court . . . ." In that letter
Illinois stated:
"Although not an appellant, the Office of the Attorney
General ... is a party in the United States Supreme
Court and is designated an appellee. The Illinois Attorney General's interest in this proceeding is identical to
that advanced by it in the lower courts and is essentially
co-terminous with the position on the issues set forth by
the appellants." Letter dated July 15, 1985, to the
Clerk of the Court from the Director of Advocacy, Office
of the Attorney General of Illinois. See App. to Reply
Brief for Appellants A-1.
Illinois' absence as an appellant requires that we examine our
jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.
II
Article III of the Constitution limits the power of federal
courts to deciding "cases" and "controversies." This requirement ensures the presence of the "concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constituunder a separate opinion by the District Court following remand.
Charles v. Carey, 579 F. Supp. 377 (ND Ill. 1983).

See
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tional questions." Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962).
The presence of a disagreement, however sharp and acrimonious it may be, is insufficient by itself to meet Art. III's requirements. This Court consistently has required, in addition, that the party seeking judicial resolution of a dispute
"show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of
the defendant." Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,
441 U. S. 91, 99 (1979); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S.
490, 501 (1975).
The nature of the injury is central to the Art. III inquiry,
because standing also reflects a due regard for the autonomy
of those most likely to be affected by a judicial decision.
"The exercise of judicial power ... can so profoundly affect
the lives, liberty, and property of those to whom it extends,"
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, 454 U. S. 464, 473 (1982),
that the decision to seek review must be placed "in the hands
of those who have a direct stake in the outcome." Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 740 (1972). It is not to be
placed in the hands of "concerned bystanders," who will use it
simply as a "vehicle for the vindication of value interests."
United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S. 669, 687 (1973).
III
Had the State of Illinois invoked this Court's appellate jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(2) and sought review of
the Court of Appeals' decision, the "case" or "controversy"
requirement would have been met, for a State has standing
to defend the constitutionality of its statute. Diamond
argues that Illinois' "letter of interest" demonstrates the
State's continued concern with the enforcement of its Abortion Law, and renders the State the functional equivalent
of an appellant. Accordingly, Diamond asserts, there is no
jurisdictional problem in the case. This claim must be
rejected.
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It is true that, as a party below, the State remains a party
here under our Rule 10.4. 14 But status as a "party" does not
equate with status as an appellant. To appear before the
Court as an appellant, a party must file a notice of appeal, the
statutory prerequisite to invoking this Court's jurisdiction.
See 28 U. S. C. § 2101(c). 15 Illinois' mere expression of interest is insufficient to bring the State into the suit as an appellant. By not appealing the judgment below, the State indicated its acceptance of that decision, and its lack of interest
in defending its own statute. 16 The State's general interest
may be adverse to the interests of appellees, but its failure to
invoke our jurisdiction leaves the Court without a "case" or
"controversy" between appellees and the State of Illinois.
Cf. Princeton University v. Schmid, 455 U. S. 100 (1982).
"The purpose of the Rule is to provide a means for a party below, who
was not notified that this Court's review has been sought by another party,
to make its interests known to the Court. Frequently, an appellant would
seek review as to only one party below, permitting the judgment to stand
as to others. See R. Stern, E. Gressman & S. Shapiro, Supreme Court
Practice, § 6-20 (6th ed. 1986), and § 6.35 (3d ed. 1962) (describing evolution of the Rule). This Court's Rule 10.4 therefore avoids the adjudication
of rights in a party's absence, but it does not provide a means to obtain
review when there has been no filing by that party of a notice of appeal.
15
28 U. S. C. § 2101(c) provides: "Any other appeal or any writ of certiorari intended to bring any judgment before the Supreme Court for review
shall be taken or applied for within ninety days after the entry of such
judgment or decree."
16
The State's reasons for abandoning this suit are not articulated in the
record. We have noted above, however, that, during the pendency of this
case before the Court of Appeals, Illinois again amended its Abortion Law.
1984 Ill. Laws, Pub. Act 83-1128. At the time of the Court of Appeals'
decision, which was based on the pre-amendment version of the Abortion
Law, the amended sections were subject to a temporary restraining order.
See Keith v. Daley, No. 84 C 5602 (ND Ill. 1984). The Court of Appeals
declined to assess the constitutionality of the 1984 amendments and rejected challenges of mootness based on those amendments. Charles v.
Daley, 749 F. 2d, at 455, 457-458. The State's inaction may well be due to
its concern with the amended , not the earlier, form of the statutes under
attack.
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Had the State sought review, this Court's Rule 10.4 makes
clear that Diamond, as an intervening defendant below, also
would be entitled to seek review, enabling him to file a brief
on the merits, and to seek leave to argue orally. But this
ability to ride "piggyback" on the State's undoubted standing
exists only if the State is in fact an appellant before the
Court; in the absence of the State in that capacity, there is no
case for Diamond to join.
IV
A
Diamond claims that his interests in enforcement permit
him to defend the Abortion Law, despite Illinois' acquiescence in the Court of Appeals' ruling of unconstitutionality.
This claim also must fail. Doctor Diamond attempts to
equate his position with that of appellees, the physicians who
instituted this suit in the District Court. Appellees, however, had standing to bring suit against the state officials who
were charged with enforcing the Abortion Law because appellees faced possible criminal prosecution. See, e. g., Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179, 188 (1973). The conflict between
state officials empowered to enforce a law and private parties
subject to prosecution under that law is a classic "case" or
"controversy" within the meaning of Art. Ill.
The conflict presented by Diamond is different. Were the
Abortion Law to be held constitutional, Diamond could not
compel the State to enforce it against appellees because "a
private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the
prosecution or nonprosecution of another." Linda R. S. v.
Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 619 (1973); see Leeke v.
Timmerman, 454 U. S. 83 (1981); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB,
467 U. S. 883 (1984). See also Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S.
37, 42 (1971); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31, 33 (1962).
Cf. Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. - , - ( s l i p op. 16) (1984)
("an asserted right to have the Government act in accordance
with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer jurisdiction on a federal court").
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The concerns for state autonomy that deny private individuals the right to compel a State to enforce its laws apply with
even greater force to an attempt by a private individual to
compel a State to create and retain the legal framework
within which individual enforcement decisions are made.
The State's acquiescence in the Court of Appeals' determination of unconstitutionality serves to deprive the State of the
power to prosecute anyone for violating the Abortion Law.
Diamond's attempt to maintain the litigation is, then, simply
an effort to compel the State to enact a code in accord with
Diamond's interests. But "the power to create and enforce a
legal code, both civil and criminal" is one of the quintessential
functions of a State. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto
Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U. S. 592, 601 (1982). Because the
State alone is entitled to create a legal code, only the State
has the kind of "direct stake" identified in Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U. S., at 740, in defending the standards embodied in that code.
B

Even if there were circumstances in which a private party
would have standing to defend the constitutionality of a challenged statute, 17 this is not one of them. Diamond is not able
to assert an injury in fact. A physician has standing to challenge an abortion law that poses for him a threat of criminal
prosecution. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S., at 188; see Planned
Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 62
(1976). In addition, a physician who demonstrates that abortion funding regulations have a direct financial impact on his
practice may assert the constitutional rights of other individuals who are unable to assert those rights themselves. See
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106 (1975). Diamond attempts
to assert an equivalent interest based upon his personal sta17

The Illinois Legislature, of course, has the power to create new
interests, the invasion of which may confer standing. In such a case, the
requirements of Art. III may be met. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare R ights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 41, n. 22 (1976).
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tus as a doctor, a father, and a protector of the unborn. We
must reject Diamond's claims that his personal and professional interests confer standing.
Diamond, who is a pediatrician, claims that if the Abortion
Law were enforced, he would gain patients; fewer abortions
would be performed and those that would be performed
would result in more live births, because the law requires a
physician to attempt to preserve the life of the aborted fetus.
By implication, therefore, the pool of potential fee-paying patients would be enlarged. The possibilities that such fetuses
would survive and then find their way as patients to Diamond
are speculative, and "unadorned speculation will not suffice
to invoke the federal judicial power." Simon v. Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S., at 44. Diamond's
situation, based on speculation and hoped-for fees is far different from that of the physicians in Wulff, supra, where actual fees were limited by the challenged Missouri statute.
Diamond also alleges that, as a physician, he has standing
to litigate the standards of medical practice that ought to be
applied to the performance of abortions. 18 Although Diamond's allegation may be cloaked in the nomenclature of a
special professional interest, it is simply the expression of a
desire that the Illinois Abortion Law as written be obeyed.
Article III requires more than simply a desire to vindicate
value interests. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S.
669, 687 (1973). It requires an "injury in fact" that
distinguishes "a person with a direct stake in the outcome of a
litigation-even though small-from a person with a mere interest in the problem." I d., at 689, n. 14. Diamond has an
interest, but no direct stake, in the abortion process. This
"abstract concern . . . does not substitute for the concrete in-

rest~(a)

' 8 Diamond's purported interest appears to
of the Abortion Law, which provides that the requirements of that law constitute the
standards of conduct for the medical profession. Since that provision is
neither before the Court nor integrally related to any of the sections at
issue in this proceeding, it cannot confer standing on Diamond.
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jury required by Art. III." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S., at 40. Similarly, Diamond's
claim of conscientious objection to abortion does not provide a
judicially cognizable interest.
Doctor Diamond also asserts that he has standing as the father of a daughter of childbearing years. First, to the extent that Diamond's claim derives from § 3(3) of the Abortion
Law, the parental notification section, he lacks standing to
continue this litigation, for it does not address the validity of
that provision. Second, to the extent that he claims an interest in ensuring that his daughter is not prescribed an
abortifacient without prior information-a concern ostensibly
triggered by the invalidation of §§ 2(10) and ll(d)-he has
failed to show that he is a proper person to advance this claim
on her behalf. Diamond has not shown either that his
daughter is currently a minor or that she is otherwise incapable of asserting her own rights. Diamond's failure to adduce
factual support renders him incapable of maintaining this appeal in his capacity as a parent. See Bender v. Williamsport
Area School Dist.,- U. S. - , - - (1986) (slip op. 14).
Nor can Diamond assert any constitutional rights of the unborn fetus. 19 Only the State may invoke regulatory measures to protect that interest and only the State may invoke
the power of the courts when those regulatory measures are
subject to challenge.

v
Finally, Diamond asserts that he has standing based on
two interests that relate not to the Abortion Law, but to his
involvement in this litigation. Neither interest suffices.
19

Diamond claims that he is asserting the rights of his prospective patients, who survive abortion, to be born with as few handicapping conditions as possible. Diamond asserted this claim before the District Court
as a basis for appointment as guardian ad litem for unborn fetuses. That
claim was rejected by the District Court.
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A
Diamond's status as an intervenor below, whether permissive or as of right, does not confer standing sufficient to keep
the case alive in the absence of the State on this appeal. Although intervenors are considered parties entitled, among
other things, to seek review by this Court, Mine Workers v.
Eagle-Picher Co., 325 U. S. 335, 338 (1945), an intervenor's
right to continue a suit in the absence of the party on whose
side intervention was permitted is contingent upon a showing
by the intervenor that he fulfills the requirements of Art. III.
See id., at 339. See also Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U. S. 352,
368 (1980).
This Court has recognized that certain public concerns may
constitute an adequate "interest" within the meaning of Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 24(a)(2), see Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v.
El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U. S. 129, 135 (1967), and has
held that an interest under Rule 24(a)(2), which provides for
intervention as of right, 20 requires a "significantly protectable interest." See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S.
517, 531 (1971). However, the precise relationship between
the interest required to satisfy the Rule and the interest required to confer standing, has led to anomalous decisions in
the Courts of Appeals. 2 1 We need not decide today whether
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(a)(2) provides for intervention
"(2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties."
21
The Courts of Appeals have reached varying conclusions as to whether
a party seeking to intervene as of right must himself possess standing.
Compare United States v. 39 ..16 Acres of Land, 754 F. 2d 855, 859 (CA7
1985), petn. for cert. pending sub nom. Save the Dunes Council, Inc. v.
United States, No. 85-426 (intervention requires an interest in excess of
that required for standing), with Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Kelley , 241 U. S. App. D. C. 340, 747 F. 2d 777 (1984) (equating
interest necessary to intervene with interests necessary to confer stand20

t..

84-1379---0PINION
14

DIAMOND v. CHARLES

a party seeking to intervene before a District Court must satisfy not only the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2), but also the
requirements of Art. III. To continue this suit in the absence of Illinois, Diamond himself must satisfy the requirements of Art. III. The interests Diamond asserted before
the District Court in seeking to intervene plainly are insufficient to confer standing on him to continue this suit now.
B

At oral argument, Diamond stated that the District Court
has assessed attorney's fees against him and the State,
· jointly and severally. This fee award, Diamond asserted,
provided the requisite standing to litigate this case:
"The standing or the real controversy thus between the
parties to this case is a very real sum of money, a judgment that runs in favor of the individual plaintiff physicians in this case and against the individual defendants
intervenors whom I represent." Tr. of Oral Arg. 4.
Diamond is claiming that an award of fees entered after a decision on the merits by the District Court and the Court of
Appeals, and after probable jurisdiction had been noted by
this Court, gives him a direct stake in the enforcement of the
Illinois Abortion Law. In short, because Diamond stands to
lose the amount of the fee unless the State's regulations concerning abortion are reinstated, he claims he has been injured by the invalidation of those regulations. 22
ing), and United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 206 U. S. App. D. C.
317, 642 F. 2d 1285 (1980) (intervention is proper only if the would-be intervenor has an interest in the outcome of the suit different from that of the
public as a whole) with Sagebush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F. 2d 525
(CA9 1983) (resolving intervention questions without reference to standing
doctrine) and Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, Inc. v. Citizens for Community Action, 558 F. 2d 861 (CA8 1977) (same).
22
While not determinative of the standing claim in this case, Diamond
responded to the fee award by filing a motion to dismiss him from the litigation and name Americans United for Life, Inc., as the sole intervenor.
See n. 6, supra. In the alternative, Diamond asked the District Court to
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But Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U. S., at 472,
makes clear that Art. III standing requires an injury with a
nexus to the substantive character of the statute or regulation at issue:
"[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the
party who invokes the court's authority to 'show that he
personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury
as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,' Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441
U. S. 91, 99 (1979), and that the injury 'fairly can be
traced to the challenged action' and is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision,' Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 38, 41 (1976)."
Any liability for fees is, of course, a consequence of Diamond's decision to intervene, but it cannot fairly be traced to
the Illinois Abortion Law. The fee award is wholly unrelated to the subject matter of the litigation, and bears no relation to the statute whose constitutionality is at issue here.
It is true that, were the Court to resolve the case on the merits against appellees, appellees would no longer be "prevailing parties" entitled to an award of fees under 42 U. S. C.
§ 1988. But the mere fact that continued adjudication would
provide a remedy for an injury that is only a byproduct of the
suit itself does not mean that the injury is cognizable under
Art. III.
VI
The State of Illinois, by failing to appeal, has indicated no
direct interest in upholding the four sections of the Abortion
Law at issue here. Diamond has stepped in, attempting to
clarify the original intervention order by stating that "A UL is an intervening defendant for all purposes, including the assessment of attorney's
fees." The motion further stated that "AUL is the real party in interest."
In assessing fees against appellant Diamond, the District Court stated that
"the State defendants and intervenors played at least equal roles in defending the abortion statute." Charles v. Daley, No. 79-C-4541 (ND Ill. Apr.
22, 1985).

\'I'
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maintain the litigation abandoned by the State in which he
resides. Because he lacks any judicially cognizable interest
in the Abortion Law, his appeal is dismissed for want of
jurisdiction.
It is so ordered.
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